Scientists as Epistemic Representatives

D. Hicks (they/them)

UC Merced
epistemic-rep.netlify.app

Practical problems of public participation

Problems of scale

small-scale democratic experiments cannot be the only conduits for the democratic scrutiny of expertise, especially since they can only involve a small number of people at a time (Pamuk 2021, 104)

Participants in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative pTA, November 2014 (Tomblin et al. 2015, 8)

Problems of practice

[C]limate modeling involves literally thousands of unforced methodological choices. Many crucial processes are poorly understood, many compromises in the name of computational exigency need to be made, and so forth …. They are buried in the historical past under the complexity, epistemic distributiveness, and generative entrenchment of climate models …. The bits of value-ladeness lie in all the nooks and crannies. (Winsberg 2012, 132)

Point of these problems

  • It’s not that I’m rejecting participatory approaches
  • But they’re not sufficient
  • For scaling up and in everyday scientific practice,
    the public needs another basis for trusting scientists

A representative alternative?

Democracy, Science, and VFI

Mitchell (2004)1

Steele (2012)2

Kappel (2014)3

Betz (2013)4

Dewey (1927)5

Du Bois (1898)6

Democracy and representation

  • Concerns that values in science would be anti-democratic:
    A small group substitutes their judgment for that of public
  • But this is just the conceptual challenge of representative democracy
  • So perhaps accounts of legitimate democratic representation would be useful here:

    Scientists, like elected officials, are representatives of the public.

Scientists aren’t elected

This is a role for which [scientists] are neither qualified nor properly authorized. The task of representing public values is delegated to political representatives through elections. Scientists informally claiming this responsibility … would … lack a legitimate formal basis ….
(Pamuk 2021, 54)

Recent(-ish) political theory

  • Informal representation
  • Constructivism about representation
  • Systems of representation

Informal representation

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with King, Benjamin Mays, and other civil rights leaders, June 22, 1963; source

Thunberg speaking at the annual climate conference, Austrian World Summit, 2019; source
informal representative
an individual or a group who speaks or acts on behalf of another individual or group in a given context, despite not having been elected or selected by means of a systematized election or selection procedure (Salkin 2021, 5)

Constructivism: Audience uptake

what makes it the case that a party emerges as an [informal representative] … is not their own say-so. Rather, people become IPRs when and because they are selected by others through audience uptake. (Salkin 2021, 3–4)

  • An audience ascribes an actor’s statements or actions to a group.
  • An audience regards an actor as a credible source of information about a group.
  • An audience relies on an actor’s testimony when attempting to understand what a group’s members want, value, or prefer.
  • An audience invites an actor to stand in for a group.

(Adapted from Salkin 2021, 9; see also Saward 2010)

Scientists and the audience uptake criteria

Hansen giving testimony before the United States Congress in 1988; source
Proportion of Freemen and Slaves among American Negroes; source
Roughly a quarter of Americans have an unfavorable view of both Biden, Trump; source

  • An audience ascribes the scientist’s statements or actions to a group.
    • James Hansen: Climate scientist turned activist
  • An audience regards the scientist as a credible source of information about a group.
    • Du Bois at the 1900 Paris Exhibition universelle
  • An audience relies on the scientist’s testimony when attempting to understand what a group’s members want, value, or prefer.
    • Public opinion research
  • An audience invites the scientist to stand in for a group.
    • Any scientist whose research is used in decisionmaking.

Epistemic interdependence

  • The world is far too complex for any one individual to know and understand more than a tiny part.
  • So we are epistemically interdependent:
    We need other people to know things on our behalf.
  • Epistemic representatives are simply the people we entrust to know and understand things on our behalf.
  • Often our epistemic representatives are unelected scientists.

(comp. Contessa 2022)

Legitimacy and trustworthiness

Does glyphosate (RoundUp) cause NHL?

  • EPA regulates pesticides, including glyphosate (RoundUp)
  • Concerns that glyphosate causes non-Hodgkins lymphoma
  • Most of the research used in pesticide regulation is done by pesticide industry scientists or contracted labs (Boone et al. 2014; Lerner 2021)


  • These scientists are our epistemic representatives
  • But is that representation legitimate?

When are epistemic representatives legitimate?

descriptive legitimacy
“people’s beliefs about political authority” and compliance with authority
normative legitimacy
“some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority” (Peter 2023, sec. 1)
  • Constructivism is a theory of descriptive legitimacy (Saward 2018, 288)

  • The concerns about science and democracy are about normative legitimacy

  • My claim: Annette Baier’s account of trustworthiness provides a normative standard for informal epistemic representation.

Baier’s account of trustworthiness

when we trust someone … we have optimism about her competence on things in our domain of interaction with her, ‘together with the expectation that the trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her’
(Almassi 2022, 578, quoting Jones)

trust
X (the trustor) trusts Y (the trustee) to do Z


For Y to deserve this trust (be trustworthy):

  1. Y must be competent at doing Z
  2. Y must be responsive to X’s interest in Z

Should these scientists be regarded as my epistemic representatives?

  1. Pesticide industry scientists must be competent to determine whether glyphosate causes NHL
  2. Pesticide industry scientists must be responsive to my interest in whether glyphosate causes NHL


  • If these scientists are not responsive, then whether or not they’re competent …
  • They’re not trustworthy.
  • And so are not my legitimate epistemic representatives.

Scientists as epistemic representatives

Informal representation
Representatives don’t need to be elected
Constructivism
They can simply be treated as representatives by an audience
Epistemic interdependence
Scientists are often treated as our epistemic representatives

But what about normative legitimacy?

Trustworthiness
Representatives (political and epistemic) must be both competent and responsive to the publics they represent

But

Trustworthiness
Representatives (political and epistemic) must be both competent and responsive to the publics they represent

But how do we ensure scientists are responsive representatives?
Participation comes back into the picture (Democratic systems theory)
But I’m out of time!

References

Almassi, Ben. 2022. “Relationally Responsive Expert Trustworthiness.” Social Epistemology 36 (5): 576–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2103475.
Betz, Gregor. 2013. “In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2): 207–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0062-x.
Boone, Michelle D., Christine A. Bishop, Leigh A. Boswell, et al. 2014. “Pesticide Regulation Amid the Influence of Industry.” BioScience 64 (10): 917–22. https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biu138.
Contessa, Gabriele. 2022. “It Takes a Village to Trust Science: Towards a (Thoroughly) Social Approach to Public Trust in Science.” Erkenntnis, ahead of print, February 17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00485-8.
Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. H. Holt.
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1898. “The Study of the Negro Problems.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 11 (1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271629801100101.
Kappel, Klemens. 2014. The Proper Role of Science in Liberal Democracy. May.
Lerner, Sharon. 2021. “The Department of Yes: How Pesticide Companies Corrupted the EPA and Poisoned America.” The Intercept, June 30. https://theintercept.com/2021/06/30/epa-pesticides-exposure-opp/.
Mitchell, Sandra D. 2004. “The Prescribed and Proscribed Values in Science Policy.” In Science, Values, and Objectivity, edited by Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters. University of Pittsburgh Press. http://books.google.com/books?id=hM8Vrot7zpUC.
Pamuk, Zeynep. 2021. Politics and Expertise: How to Use Science in a Democratic Society. Princeton University Press.
Peter, Fabienne. 2023. “Political Legitimacy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2023, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/legitimacy/.
Salkin, Wendy. 2021. “The Conscription of Informal Political Representatives*.” Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (4): 429–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12246.
Saward, Michael. 2010. The Representative Claim. OUP Oxford.
Saward, Michael. 2018. “Liminal Representation.” In Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation, edited by Dario Castiglione and Johannes Pollak. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo29203064.html.
Steele, Katie. 2012. “The Scientist Qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments.” Philosophy of Science 79 (5): 893–904. https://doi.org/10.1086/667842.
Tomblin, David, Richard Worthington, Gretchen Gano, Mahmud Farooque, David Sittenfeld, and Jason Lloyd. 2015. Informing NASA’s Asteroid Initiative: A Citizen Forum. http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ecast-informing-nasa-asteroid-initiative_tagged.pdf.
Winsberg, Eric. 2012. “Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2): 111–37. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2012.0008.

Footnotes

  1. This conflation of the domains of belief and action confuses rather than clarifies the appropriate role of values in scientific practice. (250-1)

  2. A significant worry is that scientists’ specialist knowledge permits or rather forces them to infringe on the role of those democratically elected to decide what is good for society.

  3. what policy option should ultimately be adopted is not for these scientific institutions to decide …. delegating decision‐making power over policy choices to scientific institutions would violate [Political Equality] and would easily risk violating [Liberal Neutrality] as well

  4. As political decisions are informed by scientific findings, the value free ideal ensures — in a democratic society — that collective goals are determined by democratically legitimized institutions, and not by a handful of experts

  5. A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge … No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. (364-365)

  6. The frequent alliance of sociological research with various panaceas and particular schemes of reform, has resulted in closely connecting social investigation with a good deal of groundless assumption and humbug in the popular mind …. The new study of the American Negro must avoid such misapprehensions from the outset, by insisting that historical and statistical research has but one object, the ascertainment of the facts as to the social forces and conditions of one eighth of the inhabitants of the land. (16-17)