UC Mercedepistemic-rep.netlify.app
small-scale democratic experiments cannot be the only conduits for the democratic scrutiny of expertise, especially since they can only involve a small number of people at a time (Pamuk 2021, 104)
Participants in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative pTA, November 2014 (Tomblin et al. 2015, 8)
[C]limate modeling involves literally thousands of unforced methodological choices. Many crucial processes are poorly understood, many compromises in the name of computational exigency need to be made, and so forth …. They are buried in the historical past under the complexity, epistemic distributiveness, and generative entrenchment of climate models …. The bits of value-ladeness lie in all the nooks and crannies. (Winsberg 2012, 132)
This is a role for which [scientists] are neither qualified nor properly authorized. The task of representing public values is delegated to political representatives through elections. Scientists informally claiming this responsibility … would … lack a legitimate formal basis ….
(Pamuk 2021, 54)

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what makes it the case that a party emerges as an [informal representative] … is not their own say-so. Rather, people become IPRs when and because they are selected by others through audience uptake. (Salkin 2021, 3–4)
(Adapted from Salkin 2021, 9; see also Saward 2010)



(comp. Contessa 2022)
Constructivism is a theory of descriptive legitimacy (Saward 2018, 288)
The concerns about science and democracy are about normative legitimacy
when we trust someone … we have optimism about her competence on things in our domain of interaction with her, ‘together with the expectation that the trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her’
(Almassi 2022, 578, quoting Jones)
For Y to deserve this trust (be trustworthy):
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But what about normative legitimacy?
But how do we ensure scientists are responsive representatives?
Participation comes back into the picture (Democratic systems theory)
But I’m out of time!
This conflation of the domains of belief and action confuses rather than clarifies the appropriate role of values in scientific practice. (250-1)
A significant worry is that scientists’ specialist knowledge permits or rather forces them to infringe on the role of those democratically elected to decide what is good for society.
what policy option should ultimately be adopted is not for these scientific institutions to decide …. delegating decision‐making power over policy choices to scientific institutions would violate [Political Equality] and would easily risk violating [Liberal Neutrality] as well
As political decisions are informed by scientific findings, the value free ideal ensures — in a democratic society — that collective goals are determined by democratically legitimized institutions, and not by a handful of experts
A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge … No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. (364-365)
The frequent alliance of sociological research with various panaceas and particular schemes of reform, has resulted in closely connecting social investigation with a good deal of groundless assumption and humbug in the popular mind …. The new study of the American Negro must avoid such misapprehensions from the outset, by insisting that historical and statistical research has but one object, the ascertainment of the facts as to the social forces and conditions of one eighth of the inhabitants of the land. (16-17)